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COMMENTS ON RENEGOTIATION AND
THE CONSTITUTION
MALCOLM P. SHARP*WHEN two such powerful forces as the love of gain and the pas-
sion of combat are at work, it is perhaps a little idle to ask just
how they will express themselves in constitutional law. Rene-
gotiation is one means of combining both impulses. The only disinterested
criticism of the device comes from those who consider it part of a system
to avoid the steep personal income taxes which would doubtless be the
most effective safeguard against inflation. Businessmen, except at times
in their own cases, have supported it as an alternative to heavier taxes and
to flat (say six per cent) profit limitations. Substantial profits on moderate
risks have been assured by renegotiation. The vitality and good name of
the profit system are protected for the return of peace. Production of the
materials and implements of war is stimulated by appeals to the profit
motive, as well as by combative impulses and patriotism.
For gain is not the only incentive to either businessmen or soldiers in
time of war. All the complex appeal of military enterprise and rivalry is at
work, too.
When such objectives and motives are present, it may be supposed that
arrangements which appear practical will rather easily be generalized into
the law. Practical needs, or supposed practical needs, have affected the
interpretation of the Constitution. This appears the more natural as we
come increasingly to see in what broad and general terms the framers
gave power to the national Government to which they intrusted "the
purse and the sword."
The broad outlines of current economic and political history must thus
of course be recalled in considering the place of renegotiation under the
Constitution. At the same time, narrower considerations are relevant. It
is of some importance that we keep some sense of continuity and security
as we develop new institutions. The current adjustments will be easier and
more intelligible if they are seen in relation to the familiar ideas of con-
tract and constitutional law.
* Legal Reviewer, Price Adjustment Section, Chicago Ordnance District. The opinions ex-
pressed herein are those of the author. They are not to be taken as representing War De-
partment policy.
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A number of situations may arise to test the Renegotiation Act under
the Constitution. The simplest case is that of the prime contract formed
after the enactment of the law. We have become so used to the view that
the obligation of a contract is not impaired by a prospective law that we
may say that such a situation presents no constitutional problem at all.
Yet this is not the case. In a different but somewhat comparable situa-
tion, some applicable considerations were advanced by Chief Justice Mar-
shall. Senator Taft's shock at the enactment of the Renegotiation Act
expressed itself in a statement that contracts had been abolished by the
law. His reaction is a typical beginning of a constitutional argument.
Suppose, for example, that a Congress should enact a law providing
that no undertaking in any subsequent act of the same Congress should be
binding on the United States. Suppose then that war is declared and a
scheme of war-risk insurance is provided by the same Congress. At a later
time it appears that some of the provisions for insurance have turned out
to be more generous than was anticipated. A later Congress, on the return
of peace followed by a business depression, decides to save money. It
modifies the terms of outstanding war-risk insurance term policies by
making less liberal the provisions for renewal. The later enactment is
challenged, by any appropriate method, as a denial of due 'process of law
and a taking of private property for public use without compensation.
Let us suppose, a not unlikely case, that the procedural difficulties in the
way of presenting such a challenge are overcome. Can it be doubted that
the later enactment would be held unconstitutional by any Court whose
membership can now be anticipated?
A leading case dealing with a challenge to a state law operating prospec-
tively under the Contract Clause was decided over the dissenting opinions
of Chief Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Story. New York, in the open-
ing years of the nineteenth century, had taken a long step in the direction
of what was then a novelty-a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding termi-
nating in discharge of the debtor. Chancellor Kent was a member of a
legislative committee that viewed such novelties with considerable alarm,
but he had not ventured to hold legislation of this type unconstitutional.
When the case was presented to the Supreme Court, the decision was in
favor of the validity of the legislation. The ground of the decision has
become an elementary principle of law. A prospective law enters into the
terms of later contracts, and so does not impair their obligation.,
I Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213 (1827). With the dissent in this case, compare
Senator Taft's observations as reported in the press and in the Congressional Record for April
23, 1942. See 88 Cong. Rec. 3774-76 (1942).
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The principle is now elementary and is considered obvious; but it did
not seem so to the two ablest lawyers on the bench. Mr. Justice Story, the
learned lawyer's lawyer, and Chief Justice Marshall, the creative conserv-
ative, both thought that such a law did impair the obligation of contracts
made after its enactment.
A contract, they said in effect, is a promise which can be enforced at
law. There are many familiar limitations on the enforcement of promises.
If they are against public policy or barred by a statute of limitations, or
within the operation of statutes of frauds, undertakings which would
otherwise be contracts cannot be enforced. Subject, of course, as it was to
such definition, the classification of human relationships known as con-
tract was reasonably well determined at the time the Constitution was'
ratified. Any law which deprives undertakings within that classification
of their binding force must be said to impair the obligation of contracts.
So the state statute which permits one who has incurred simple commer-
cial debts to rid himself of those debts, on the concurrence of a fraction of
his creditors, must be said to impair the obligation of contracts.
The argument of the dissenting opinions is closely related to the doc-
trines of freedom of contract and unconstitutional conditions which have
prevailed in more recent decisions of the Supreme Court. Vary the terms
to suit the words "liberty" and "property" in the Fifth Amendment, and
the force of the theory is apparent. In an extreme instance of bad faith like
the modification of war-risk insurance supposed, the result can hardly be
in doubt.
Nor is the extreme case an unbelievable one. In fact, we have already had
it in the form of retrospective legislation affecting first World War war-risk
insurance, passed during the great depression as an economy measure. A
unanimous Court speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis held the retro-
spective legislation unconstitutional.2 The Court went far in intimating
that it would insist at any opportunity that the Government provide
some means for discharging its obligations on war-risk insurance. Admin-
istrative determination might be substituted for action in the Court of
Claims, and sovereign immunity invoked, but the obligation to pay could
not be avoided consistently with the Constitution.
The requirements of elementary good faith are insisted on in this opin-
ion and were finally observed in the case. The difference between the case
decided and the case of prospective legislation just supposed is trifling.
The lapse of a short time between undertaking and repudiation might
2 Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934).
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make a situation created by prospective legislation even more flagrant
than the case which actually occurred. There can be little doubt that a
simple program of economy at the expense of holders of war-risk insurance
would in any situation find little support from lawyers now likely to be
appointed to the Supreme Court.
It will be observed that the war-risk insurance case was decided by the
same Court which upheld what was in effect the repeal of the Govern-
ment's obligation to pay gold to holders of government bonds.3 The Court
did not put the matter this way, and the opinion in the gold clause case
rested on the ground that bondholders could show no damage as a result
of the Government's gold legislation. It is not necessary to resort to such
refinements to discover a distinction between the war-risk insurance case
and the gold clause case. The attempted modification of war-risk insur-
ance contracts was simply a device to economize at the expense of the
policyholders. The provisions of the devaluation legislation applicable to
government gold bonds were a consistent if not indispensable feature of a
general program for the purpose of combating nationwide deflation by
familiar monetary measures. Just as an existing contract may be modified
by state legislation in the interests of well-defined general policy under the
authority of the so-called police power, so there can be no doubt that con-
tractual obligations may be modified to some extent in the interests of
well-defined general national policy, by congressional enactment.
Senator Taft is right in one respect. Even prospective legislation might
conceivably go so far in destroying the reliability of government obliga-
tions that it would violate the Constitution. The prospective provisions
of the Renegotiation Act cannot be justified simply on the ground that
they operate prospectively. The act must be justified, if at all, in both its
prospective and its retrospective operation, on the ground that while it
may affect the terms of government obligations, it does so only in the
interest of well-defined general national policy.
It does not seem difficult to justify the act as a whole on this ground.
Procurement contracts have been made to a greater or lesser extent
throughout the war under conditions which come close to warranting cor-
rection as a matter of common law. Prime contracts themselves give the
Government privileges of termination, and the general pattern of procure-
ment contracts reflects uncertainty about both the present and the future.
The powers of the Government at war are in any case extensive. As an in-
cident of purchasing, price standards need not be as dearly defined, for
example, as tax standards.
3 Perry v. United States, 294 U. S-.330 (1935).
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The standard procurement contract entered into directly with the
Government has been characterized by extraordinary flexibility. 4 The
first step may be a letter which authorizes the contractor to proceed, and
undertakes on specific conditions to reimburse him for his costs. This in-
strument is followed in the ordinary course of events by a more elaborate
writing. Here the Government typically reserves the right to change
specifications and schedules, along with a sweeping privilege of termina-
tion for its own convenience. Again, on termination, reasonably generous
provisions protect the contractor in recovering his costs. Termination pro-
visions in effect for prime contracts and comparable provisions contem-
plated for the protection of subcontractors are part of a coherent scheme
for distributing the risks of procurement contracts over the national com-
munity as a whole, and thus compensating contractors for the disadvan-
tages of flexibility.
It is apparent that results comparable to renegotiation might have been
reached at the time when the Renegotiation Act was passed, by the
wholesale exercise of the Government's option to terminate prime con-
tracts. In a large variety of transactions classified as subcontracts the
result would have been simply to deprive subcontractors of orders to
which they had no contractual rights. In other cases prime contractors
had reserved a privilege to terminate subcontracts. In still other cases the
practical consequence would have been negotiation between prime con-
tractors and subcontractors for the modification of outstanding contractu-
al undertakings. It seems likely that the hypothetical sweeping exercise of
the Government's option to terminate prime contracts would have oper-
ated practically to terminate many subcontracts as well.
On termination, new contracts would, of course, have been entered into.
In case of difficulty the Government had always the final weapon of the
mandatory order. In April, 1942, simple contractual machinery existed
for the elimination of outstanding procurement contract claims and the
substitution of new ones. It was obviously clumsy machinery, and the Re-
negotiation Act produced the same result in much more elegant and prac-
tical form.
Quite apart from contractual privileges of modification and termina-
tion, procurement contracts entered into during these first months and
years of our participation in the war have been subject to something of
the same kind of infirmity as contracts entered into under mistake about
4 See Fain and Watt, War Procurement-A New Pattern in Contracts, 44 Col. L. Rev. 126
(1944). This article provides the acquaintance with procurement which is indispensable to an
understanding of renegotiation.
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either the present or the future. A mistake in arithmetic or in the tabula-
tion of items may make a builder's accepted bid unenforceable., A railroad
brakeman who settles for a personal injury, when both he and his em-
ployer assume confidently that his injury is a minor one, may avoid the
settlement when it turns out that he is incapacitated for life.6 A steamship
company which pays the supposed widow of a long-lost husband, on the
assumption entertained by both parties that he was killed in a collision,
may recover the payment on the discovery that it was another man with
the same name.7 When seats were sold for the coronation procession for
Edward VII and his illness delayed the ceremony, the owners of houses
along the procession route were held to have no right to money which was
to have been paid after the date first set for the procession.8 Last year the
highest English authority went further, and held that in a comparable
situation money paid before the date of performance could be recovered
by the person who had paid.9 While a singer's estate might be liable to a
theater owner, at least for part of his advertising expenses, it appears that
there is no liability whatever at common law if a singer dies between the
date of a contract and the time for performance."°
The dearly expressed and understood terms of an agreement may
yield when the agreement is made in circumstances of uncertainty. Gen-
erally, indeed, the parties must be certain that the uncertainty does not
exist, in order to get relief later from courts of equity or common law.
They must be unconscious of the chances that they are taking and must
indeed, as some of the cases can be read, act confidently on the assumption
that no such contingency as in fact develops will take place. In a com-
munity occupied with normal commerce, risk and uncertainty bearing is
one of the primary -functions of contract. But even in such a society
mistake about the present or the future may be so serious that a contract
made under its influence will be recognized as a pathological case. Such a
contract does not facilitate an intelligent distribution of cost or uncertain-
ty, nor does it produce the beneficial effects supposed to come when well-
informed people arrange for the conduct of their own affairs.
s See 5 Williston, Contracts secs. 1578-I579 (rev. ed. 1937).
6 St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Cauthen, I12 Okla. 256, 241 Pac. i88 (r925) (alter-
native ground of decision). See 48 A.L.R. 1447.
7 GrandTrunk Western R. Co..v.Lahiff, 218 Wis. 457, 261 N.W. i (1935).
8 Chandler v. Webster, [i9o4] i K.B. 493. See 6 Williston, Contracts, secs. 1953-1954 (rev.
ed. 1938).
9 Fibroso Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Coombe Barbour, Ltd., [943] A. C. 32.
10 Compare Taylor v.'Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826 (Q.B. 1863).
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Somewhat different, but strictly comparable, considerations apply to
an extemporized war economy and to legislation dealing with government
contracts made in such an economy. Everyone has been conscious of the
extraordinary uncertainties surrounding procurement contracts. These
uncertainties have determined the flexible form of the contracts them-
selves. Repetition has dulled the force of the observation that wholly
novel manufacturing and buying problems are presented in the procure-
ment of the materials of war. Neither contractors nor War Department
officials have had experience with the manufacture of combat planes and
bombs on anything like the scale required for the purpose of this war. No
one has been able to foresee the changes in requirements which occur as
we pass in a recurring cycle from defense to offense and back again for a
time to defense in different theaters of war. The reported shifts in German
and Japanese concern with plane production, from bombers to fighters,
are simply the most recent dramatic examples of the changes required by
the shifting fortunes of war.
In procurement everyone concerned has been aware of the amount of
uncertainty involved in planning production for military purposes. By
ordinary commercial standards this might be a sufficient ground for deny-
ing relief for mistake or frustration in a court of equity or a court of law
governed by judge-made precedents. Our traditional equity and common
law rules have been criticized in some respects as unduly limiting relief for
uncertainty, particularly uncertainty about the future. Uncertainty about
the present, under the heading of mistake, has in some cases been handled
with considerable liberality. Though a contractor is aware of the un-
certainties which surround his transaction, these uncertainties may be so
great as to make it impossible to work out any intelligent assumption of
risk. Any arrangement the contractor makes may work out in an imprac-
tical way, because it is out of the question even to begin to calculate the
possible permutations and combinations of circumstances which may
occur. Under such circumstances a legislative and administrative program
may quite properly go beyond the common law in relieving contractors
and the Government from the consequences of uncertainty. Liberal pro-
vision has been made for contractors in the form of the regulations and
practices governing Requests for Relief. The Renegotiation Act is a
means of providing comparable relief for the Government. It does not go
so far beyond common law principles, adjusted to suit the peculiarities of
current enterprise, as to raise even a serious doubt about constitutional
validity.
A number of narrow objections to such arguments may serve to bring
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out the character of the position advanced. It is sometimes said that
manufacturers who continue to make their ordinary peacetime products
and to sell these products under conditions like those of peace, sometimes
to their regular customers, are not dealing under conditions in which war-
time uncertainties play a peculiar part. The argument has been advanced,
particularly on behalf of some subcontractors, that their contracts for
standard products are practically like peacetime contracts, and are not
infected with any peculiar degree of uncertainty. It is said to follow that
the moral justification for renegotiation fails in such situations.
This does not seem to be the case. In such situations, where refunds are
required it is usually because of an extraordinary increase in volume as
compared with the contractors' peacetime base years. If contracting
officers had enough knowledge and time, they could, presumably, insist on
prime contract prices which would reflect savings that prime contractors-
might insist on in their transactions with subcontractors, in view of the
enormous increase in volume which subcontractors have been enjoying.
The refinements of the marginal-productivity theory may suggest diffi-
culties with this argument. Here, as elsewhere in the field of renegotia-
tion, it seems a sufficient answer to observe that the Government may
properly treat all of a contractor's or subcontractor's war business as a
unit. To say that a contractor or subcontractor might have done better in
making money if he had expanded production somewhat less, and had
chosen what war orders he would take, is no answer to the claims of a
government which, by its war business as a whole, has given contractors
and subcontractors unpredictable profits, as a result of the uncertainty,
speed, and expansion which characterized procurement.
It may be said that, apart from mere mistake of expression, relief for
mistake or frustration in contract law is commonly given by rescission,
not reformation. A few groups of cases dealing with land contracts and
conveyances are an exception to the general rule that, while the contracts
which parties have made may be deprived of effect, they will not be re-
made by courts. As in the discussion of termination privileges, so here,
the argument if followed would lead only to a rather clumsy treatment of
the situation. Procurement contracts might be rescinded and new ones
made. In that event the Government would still have the right, at any
rate, by the exercise of a mandatory order to decide the terms of the new
contracts. It is a short cut, and one to which patriotic contractors are
ordinarily quite willing to agree, to arrange for flexible reconsideration of
contracts already made, with the Government's extraordinary powers
still unused but available.
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Again, it is sometimes urged as a defense against relief for mistake that-
a party has greatly altered his position on the faith of an existing arrange-
ment. Where it is at all practicable, however, the fair treatment of such a
situation seems rather to require fair compensation to the person who has
altered his position, as a condition of giving relief to the other party."
As a condition of relief from mistake by renegotiation, if that is what oc-
curs, the Government is required to compensate each contractor for his
costs and to give him a reasonable profit on account of work done on the
faith of a procurement contract. It seems certain that if the Renegotiation
Act could in any case be so applied as to impair a contractor's right to
such payments, it would be found that the contractor could derive legal
protection from the Constitution. A requirement of elementary good
faith would seem to protect the contractor, whether his transactions oc-
curred before or after the enactment of the applicable provision of the
Renegotiation Act, in his expectation of recovering his costs and securing
a reasonable profit on the faith of his procurement contract.
It has been observed that the difficulties created by uncertainty have
been increased by the necessity for speed. The demand for implements of
war is both unpredictable and urgent. Under these circumstances con-
tractors, habitually and inevitably concerned about their solvency, are
in a strong bargaining position. They have every normal reason to guard
their position carefully, and it is to their credit and the credit of all the
contracting officers that they have moved fast and effectively. Yet the
situation is one in which specialized experienced sellers dealing with an
improvised set of buying agencies, staffed on the whole by men of less
experience, have a great business advantage.
The essential contractor has a kind of legal duty to serve the Govern-
ment. While this duty matures only on the use of a mandatory order, it
seems proper to say that the obligation itself, or at least a significant legal
relationship approaching the obligation, exists before the use of such an
order. A threatened violation of this obligation might thus constitute
duress in the most limited sense of the word. That is, it might be a viola-
tion of a legal right accompanied by powerful psychological pressure, like
that produced by threats of violence or imprisonment, blackmail, or the
withholding of badly needed property, or the threat of breach of contract
under conditions threatening serious economic loss, in private cases. 2
11 Paget v. Marshall, 28 Ch. D. 255, 267 (1884). Cf. Jones v. Waring and Gillow, Ltd.,
[19261 A.C. 670, where the propriety of this treatment of mistake was recognized, though the
case was held not to call for it. But compare Fibroso Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson
Coombs Barbour, Ltd., supra, note 9.
12 See 5 Williston, Contracts secs. 16oi-i6o8 (rev. ed. 1937).
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It is true that in a dubious case coming from the last war the Supreme
Court has held that a contractor might go a long way in taking advantage
of unskilled purchasers and the Government's need in exacting a high
profit from war contracts. 3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, however,
indicates persuasively how close to the line the case came. His argument
is ample justification for legislation which has the effect of subjecting such
contracts to revision at the election of the Government.
Generally, however, duress is not a word to describe the conduct of the
great mass of patriotic contractors in this war. They are inevitably in a
position of economic strength. If he is capable of producing urgent items,
every contractor, regardless of his costs, is needed in the program. Each
contractor is thus in a sense a monopolist, and he is likely to be free from
the kind of check which competition affords even in a normal sellers' mar-
ket. Competition cannot be looked for in the immediate future to give
anything like the protection with respect to price and profits which the
theory of the capitalistic system requires.
There is thus the same reason for introducing special safeguards which
has justified minimum wage regulation and minimum or maximum price
regulation in civilian industries under various circumstances.1 The Office
of Price Administration cannot in the nature of the case serve the purpose,
for its job is to set prices just high enough to give the needed marginal
producer at least his costs. It is clear that the marginal war producer
must have at least his costs and that his more efficient fellows, in their
strong position, are not to have their price determined by his, on war con-
tracts. With the speed properly required of procurement officers, it is thus
plain that further supervision is in order. The reference to wage and price
control should serve to indicate that on any assumption a workmanlike
scheme of supervision is readily within the limits of an appropriate con-
stitutional power.
The making and renegotiation of contracts for the materials of war is, of
course, an exercise of the Government's war powers. These include the
powers of Congress to raise and maintain a military establishment and to
declare war, and the President's power as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces. Today we do not need to be reminded how extensive these
powers are. Yet there would hardly be an occasion for these comments if
even these powers were not subject to constitutional limits.
3 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
'4Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922)
(modification of existing contract rights by wartime rent legislation constitutional); Sunshine
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 3io U.S. 381 (194o); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 1oo (1941); Opp
Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
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The flexible pattern of procurement contracts and the circumstances of
uncertainty and pressure under which they are made mark them as ap-
propriate for correction and supervision. There are, of course, other
strongly positive reasons which justify the exercise of the war powers in
eliminating excessive profits from operations under Government con-
tracts.
Farmers, workers, and modest taxpayers, as well as managers and
owners, have been called on to carry economic burdens resulting from the
war. A fair distribution of burdens and benefits is to be desired in any
case. A scheme which commends itself generally as fair is in the interests
of those who are concerned with maintaining a strong and popular system
of competitive capitalism through the stresses of war and the adjustments
of a postwar period.
More immediately, the control and moderation of inflationary influ-
ences is necessary to the prosecution of the war itself. Whatever the im-
portance of the dollar amounts involved in renegotiation, an example of
self-control on the part of business leaders is essential, if the more poorly
paid members of the community are to moderate their demands for com-
pensation adjusted to a price level which is almost bound to rise to a
greater or less extent. Control of inflation is a proper object for the exer-
cise of the Government's fiscal and war powers.
Even more important, as has been pointed out, is the maintenance of
fighting spirit in both the ununiformed and the uniformed forces. The
profit motive may with some difficulty be combined with warlike enter-
prise, but it must inevitably be eclipsed by other motives in a successful
war. The preservation of a relatively high degree of harmony, unity, and
esprit de corps is promoted by the limits on war profits necessary to
satisfy the national conscience. The development of appropriate limits
seems on this ground a proper exercise of the war powers.
In the end, of course, the simplest form of statement takes us back to
the boys who enlist or are drafted. Whatever the technical difficulties, no
one has suggested a moral or constitutional objection to the drafting of
capital as well as men. The soldier and the civilian alike have constitu-
tional rights, but their normal civil rights may be closely restricted in the
interests of the military effort.
This is not to say that unnecessary restrictions should be lightly ac-
quiesced in. The sane treatment of freedom of expression in this war seems
to some who recall the restrictive measures of the last war to have im-
proved morale. Workers, managers, and owners alike are engaged in the
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struggle to maintain free institutions. The fewer the interferences with
such institutions as freedom of contract, the better.
Unwarranted and extreme interferences with economic liberty, even in
wartime, may meet a constitutional limit. Yet we have needed only an
elementary recapitulation of familiar observations to remind ourselves of
the limits to which economic activity is properly subject in wartime. There
can be little doubt that in view of its moderate interference with contract
rights and its function as an appropriate feature of wartime control, the
Renegotiation Act is a proper exercise of the fiscal and military powers of
the federal Government.
One difficulty remains to be considered. An old and sound instinct has
expressed itself in much of the controversy over delegation of legislative
powers to executive and administrative officials. Democracies have tired
at times in Western history and turned over their powers to a strong man
or group of men.
Yet it is doubtful whether the text of our Constitution affords any
adequate basis for an effective limit on the delegation of legislative powers
in domestic affairs. Specific provisions prohibit Congress from deciding
to abolish elections and adjourn indefinitely. Yet, in spite of the Schechter
case,IS Congress must, and therefore may, in many cases give general and
even vague directions with respect to policy, leaving it to be implemented
by administrative regulations and decisions.
The directions in the original Renegotiation Act to eliminate excessive
profits were indeed vague. Some historical content could be derived from
parallels in the excess profit tax legislation, and these parallels have proved
useful. Terms in that legislation, however, could hardly be treated as in-
corporated by reference into the Renegotiation Act.
It should be recognized dearly that the Renegotiation Act is in no
proper sense a tax measure; and when this has once been noticed the prob-
lem of the legislative standard seems to become easier. No government
short of heaven will be able to finance itself by paying out large sums to
individuals and taking back portions of those sums. The Renegotiation
Act cannot possibly be viewed as anything like a revenue-raising measure.
It cuts expenses, but it does not raise net amounts. However debatable
the effect of renegotiation on later price structures, the Renegotiation
Act cannot be classified as anything but a pricing statute. It is designed
to decrease the amount of money paid by the Government for war goods.
It has never been supposed that legislation authorizing disbursements
or even loans was subject to the same requirement of a legislative standard
I SSchechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (i935).
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as that which has been thought to apply to regulatory and particularly to
criminal statutes. It may be said that no one has a "right" to any particu-
lar price on what he sells to the Government. It would perhaps be more
realistic to say that Congress has not been accustomed always to set
"standards" for government pricing. Purchasing agents must act honestly
and fairly, and they must commonly follow prescribed procedures, but
price policy, particularly in war times, has in many situations been left
largely to administrative determination.
General statements are thus enough in legislation authorizing purchas-
ing and giving directions about the terms on which purchases are to be
made. The phrase "excessive profits" is perhaps indeed no more vague
than some of the directive phrases which have been held to satisfy the
requirement that Congress shall not delegate its powers without setting a
standard for administrative officers."6
Certainly the phrase has not proved so meaningless as to leave the
agencies administering the act without any intelligent guidance. It has
proved possible to develop general directions which are at the same time
by no means meaningless or ineffectual. A reading of renegotiation re-
ports will doubtless disclose instances of inconsistencies, but it will also
disclose a continual reference back to a list of relevant factors which
limits the arbitrary discretion of the individual officer. The appearance of
a list of guiding principles in the revised act indicates at once how admin-
istrative conduct has, bit by bit, come to be described and guided in gen-
eral terms, and how easy it is completely to satisfy any kind of constitu-
tional requirement of an administrative standard in the delegation of
legislative powers.
Political judgments which seek expression in constitutional law may be
sound in this as in other respects; but it does not follow that they can be
served by any available constitutional doctrine. The sporadic appearance
of decisions requiring Congress to set a standard in delegating its power
may moderate somewhat tendencies toward executive rule in domestic
matters. How little the formula can affect the general outlines of social
and political history becomes apparent at once when one looks at the con-
duct of our foreign affairs. The Schechter case 7 stands in sharp contrast to
the Curtiss-Wright case.'8 Congress is expressly given the power to declare
16 New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
'7 Supra note 15.
is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 39 (r936). Speaking
through Mr. Justice Sutherland, the Court considered the President's powers in external
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war under the Constitution, and the Senate's part in treaty-making is
assured by a provision which is explicit and intelligible. Yet the Court has
said fhat the President may properly exercise general and ultimate con-
trol over our foreign relations.
We are familiar with the extent to which the Executive has gone in the
exercise of control and leadership in foreign affairs. The conduct of war
inevitably leads to extended executive control in domestic matters. It is
doubtful whether any traditional constitutional doctrine of delegation
could properly have been extended to limit Congress and the President in
domestic matters. Certainly no such doctrine is to be looked for now.
The conclusion is that private rights have not been seriously modified
by the Renegotiation Act and that such modifications as have been made
were in the exercise of the war powers of Congress and the President. The
authority delegated to administrative agencies by the act has been suffi-
ciently defined for constitutional purposes.
affairs. "In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the na-
tion." See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-230 (1942).
